ly way of controlling TB spread within a hospital still resides in a high degree of suspicion by first-line physicians, who constitute the entrance to the system. 
Tuberculosis Contact
Tracing Among Healthcare Workers: Source-Case Selection, Method of Tracing, and Outcome of Follow-Up To the Editor:
Nosocomial tuberculosis (TB) is known to occur, usually when infectious patients are not recognized and properly isolated. 1 -2 To minimize transmission, most healthcare facilities implement TB prevention measures based on the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidelines. 3 Among these measures is conducting contact tracing in suspected or confirmed TB cases. 4 Therefore, mostTB control programs include tracing of exposed healthcare workers (HCWs). The value of these measures has not been examined but is likely to depend on the prevalence of TB, source-case selection, engineering conditions that may influence ventilation, and tracking methods. We elected to study the approach to contact tracing in our hospital to assess the effectiveness of tracing and outcome of follow-up.
The study was conducted at a 607-bed tertiary-care referral center with 6 to 10 cases of TB per year. All TB contact tracing conducted between December 1993 and April 1995 was identified by examining the records of the Infection Control Department. All cases with positive acid-fast bacilli (AFB) smears or mycobacterial cultures were identified by reviewing microbiology files. The clinical and microbiological characteristics of source-cases and all patients who were positive by AFB smear or culture were characterized by reviewing their medical records. For each episode, the method of identifying and tracing exposed HCWs, the number of employees that were followed, and the results of follow-up were determined. Additionally, hospital and departmental tuberculin-test conversion rates during the study period were noted.
Contact tracing was considered when the attending physician and the Infection Control Department were notified of positive AFB smears or cultures. An infection control practitioner reviewed the case, identified those who were not placed in TB isolation, and consulted the attending physician to determine the likelihood of TB and whether a contact tracing was warranted. The medical records then were reviewed to define the areas where exposure to the sourcecase prior to implementing isolation was possible and identify potential exposees. Transmission to household contacts was not investigated and identifying intensely exposed HCWs was not attempted. Notification of exposure then was sent to the physicians involved in the patient's care; the physician of any hospital roommate of the source-case; supervisors of any identified exposed HCW; all departments with potential exposees who are difficult to account for, such as phlebotomists and radiology technicians; and the Occupational Health Department Each department supervisor independently notified involved HCWs at risk and recommended a follow-up at the Occupational Health Department for proper investigation. Tuberculin skin tests were placed and read by a staff member of the Occupational Health Department or the employee's own physician, and the results were reported to the Occupational Health Department. A follow-up skin test usually was attempted in 12 weeks. Whenever the smear or the preliminary culture was determined later to be mycobacteria other than TB (MOTT), a notice was sent to disregard the previous exposure warning.
Twenty-one contact tracings initiated during the study period were examined. The source-cases represented 12 (75%) of 16 patients with positive AFB smears, 7 (14.9%) of 47 patients with positive cultures, and 2 individuals with granulomas and AFB in lung tissues. All source cases had respiratory symptoms and abnormal chest radiographs. The final diagnosis was TB in 13 instances, MOTT in 5 instances, and unknown (culture negative) in 3 cases. The AFB smear was positive in 12 cases: 6 untreated TB patients, 2 TB cases on therapy, 3 patients with MOTT, and 1 individual with an uncertain diagnosis. The intensity of the AFB smear did not differentiate TB from non-TB cases. Clinical and radiological characteristics were comparable in cases with TB or MOTT. Potential exposure occurred because isolation was delayed in 13 instances (62%), discontinued early in 4 instances (19%), or not implemented in an additional 4 instances (19%). The average duration of traced exposure was 5.5 days (range, 1-18 days), for a total of 115 days. As it turned out, contact tracing was initiated in 6 potentially highly infectious TB cases (untreated smearand culture-positive or cavitary disease), 10 cases with low risk for infectiousness (smear-negative noncavitary TB, 5; smear-positive, culture-negative TB on treatment, 2; smear-positive, culture-negative unknown diagnosis, 3); and 5 cases with MOTT; Table) .
Four hundred seventeen HCWs reported to the Occupational Health Department in response to the exposure notification (an average of 18.7 HCWs per source case). Twenty-five of these individuals were known to have previously positive tuberculin tests; no further testing was done, as they were asymptomatic. No tuberculin-skin test conversion was noted among the remaining 392 tuberculinnegative subjects. During the study period, routine skin testing with a 75% compliance rate showed an annual hospitalwide conversion rate of 0.41% (12/2,928 employees). These converters were scattered among various departments without clustering, and none recalled a specific exposure.
Our findings show that, in spite Villarino and coinvestigators from the CDC conducted a doubleblind trial to compare the reaction size and specificity of skin testing with Aplisol, Tubersol, and the standard purified protein derivative (PPD-Sl). Between May 14, 1997, and October 28, 1997, 1,555 persons at low risk of latent TB infection in six US cities received four tuberculin skin reagents at sites assigned at random. These included simultaneous skin tests with intense exposure. This strategy likely will improve the outcome of the investigational approach and free resources for better utilization. We caution that this proposed strategy may not be appropriate without compliance to regularly scheduled skin testing and may not be applicable to facilities having a higher prevalence of TB, suboptimal engineering conditions, or HCWs with risk factors for disease progression.
